The Basis of Contractual Obligation: An Essay in Speculative Jurisprudence by Fridman, G. H. L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
2-1-1974
The Basis of Contractual Obligation: An Essay in
Speculative Jurisprudence
G. H. L. Fridman
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. H. Fridman, The Basis of Contractual Obligation: An Essay in Speculative Jurisprudence, 7 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol7/iss1/1
THE BASIS OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION: AN
ESSAY IN SPECULATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
by G. H. L. Fridman*
I
Forty years have passed since Morris Cohen discussed various juris-
prudential foundations of contract in the pages of the Harvard Law
Review.' Much has been written on the subject since then. In the
courts there has been considerable development of several notions that
bear strongly on the whole question of contractual (and extra-contrac-
tual) obligation. Although the issues have been debated at length on
a number of occasions from differing standpoints and with varying
conclusions, there is a fascination about fundamental concepts that
keeps drawing lawyers back toward such matters, if not in the hope
that anything new may be discovered or said, at least with the expec-
tation that by maintaining interest in such questions it may be possible
to ensure that in the hurly-burly of everyday legal life fundamental
principles are not forgotten. It is always necessary to question basic'
assumptions of the law, lest too much be taken for granted and ef-
forts not be expended to improve and develop the legal system in the
light of changed social, economic, and political perceptions and condi-
ions.
Of all legal concepts, that of contract is one of the most important.
Kohler has pointed out how vital such an idea is in any developed
society.' Whatever the political or economic structure of society, how-
ever primitive or advanced, some notion of contract has been found
not only useful but also necessary. Naturally the nature and content of
such notion has varied with changes in society. But in every instance
there is a common factor, namely that in certain circumstances, cer-
tain "agreements" or, if you prefer, "promises," must be kept, and fail-
ure to keep them will result in whatever sanction is permitted or recog-
* M.A., B.C.L., LL.M., Dean of The Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
1. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. R v. 553 (1933). See also Gardner,
An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1932),
in which the author submits twelve principles "which should guide the administration
of justice in controversies arising out of consensual relations between men." Id. at
39. The real question, however, is: What are consensual relations?
2. 1. Kom.ER, Tan PHmosoPay oF LAw 134-36 (1969).
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nized by the society in which the parties to such agreement or the one
making the promise belong. In every such society, the search has been
for some principle or principles from which a distinction can be made
between agreements or promises that must be so maintained or per-
formed and those which are permitted to be neglected or unfulfilled.
In this respect, I should distinguish the idea of freedom of contract
which accompanied the development of the concept of contract in An-
glo-American common law. There can be no doubt that one of the
great, fundamental principles (perhaps nowadays one can call them
"shibboleths") of the common law was the freedom of individuals to
undertake contractual obligations, a freedom, now, possibly, undergoing
a decline. 8 Even in its heyday, the idea of freedom of contract was al-
ways firmly ensconced behind the protective bastion of the legal concept
of a contract. Parties were free to enter into whatever contractual obli-
gations they desired (as long as their contract did not infringe upon the
mandatory provisions of the law with respect to public policy, legality,
and so forth), but their transaction had to enshrine the essence of con-
tractual obligation as understood by the law if it was to have any
ultimate validity and effect. Wherein lay such essence?
It has been shown many times, and may be accepted as axiomatic,
that the common law evolved the idea of consideration as the corner-
stone of contractual obligation, shrugged off any other rival suggestions
(such as the notion that moral obligations should be legally binding),
and concentrated on the notion that only a "bargain" could be the
basis for a valid legal transaction that could be called a contract. What
was, and is, a "bargain" is a matter of debate.4 There are many techni-
calities surrounding the law of consideration, which in part account
for the difficulties of this artificial notion, and have resulted in the op-
probrium which has been expressed from time to time. One instance
is the doctrine of Foakes v. Beer. 5 In that case, the House of Lords,
putting into more modern guise the archaic language of Pinnel's case,0
held that payment of a lesser sum in discharge of the larger amount
owed to the creditor was not sufficient consideration for the promise to
remit the larger amount. Hence the original debt, i.e., to the extent to
which it had not been settled, still bound the original debtor. Though
3. Fridman, Freedom of Contract, 2 OTrAwA L. REv. 1 (1967).
4. For some early discussions, see Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HAaV.
L. REv. 515 (1899); Langdell, Mutual Promises as a Consideration for Each Other,
14 HARv. L. REv. 496 (1901); Williston, Successive Promises of the Same Perform-
ance, 8 H-Iv. L. REv. 27 (1894).
5. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
6. 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602).
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this doctrine has been subject to criticism in the United States, 7 re-
jected in some jurisdictions,8 and altered by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,9 it is nonetheless good law in England and Canada (except
in the Province of Alberta).10 Another situation which has provided
troublesome effects is that of contracts for the benefit of third parties.
In Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Selfridge & Co.," decided in 1915,
the House of Lords held that the doctrine of consideration operated
to prevent the creation of third party rights under contracts. More re-
cently in Beswick v. Beswick,' 2 the same court was able to grant such
a third party a right of action but on a different basis, without making
any inroads on the basic doctrine enunciated in 1915. Although in
the United States there appear to be limitations on the stringency of
this doctrine, stemming from the decision in Lawrence v. Fox,3 many
problems remain.' 4
It is not surprising, therefore, that almost forty years ago the Law
Revision Committee in England recommended changes in the law by
reason of the criticism and limitations that had come to light over the
years. 5 Nothing, of course, was ever done to enact such reforms or
take account of the criticism-nothing, that is, by legislation. But the
common law (or should it be equity?) has not stood still in this re-
gard, any more than it has in other respects, over the intervening per-
iod. Whether such changes have been sufficient is another question.
The doctrine of consideration is really nothing more than an elabo-
rate fiction invented by the common law to take care of the problem
of differentiating serious promises worthy of recognition and enforce-
ment from those which should not be held binding in law. 6 It might
be said that the courts were attempting to follow the practices of busi-
nessmen and make the law of contract into a commercial instrument.
7. See J. CAL1.AAi & J. PERILLO, Coma-RAcrs 124-30 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CALA M A & PERmU.o]; cf. Comment, The Pre Existing Duty Rule of Foakes v. Beer-
A Victory by Default for Stare Decisis, 11 Aiz. L. REv. 344 (1969).
8. See, e.g., Frye v. Hubbel, 68 A. 325 (N.H. 1907).
9. UNwoRM CoMMmRcL CODE § 2-209(1). But cf. UNWOPM COMMERCIAL CODE §
1-2,07.
10. Judicature Act, Rnv. STAT. ALBERTA c. 193, § 34(8) (1970).
11. [1915] A.C. 847.
12. [1968] A.C. 58 (1967).
13. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
14. CALAmAU & PEmILo, supra note 7, at 379-84, 390-400; cf. Ridder v. Blethen,
166 P.2d 834 (Wash. 1946).
15. See W. ANSON, LAW OF CONTRACT 112-13 (22d ed. 1964).
16. For differing views, see Chloros, The Doctrine of Consideration and the Reform
of the Law of Contract, 17 Ig'L & CoNT. L.Q. 137 (1968); Hamson, The Reform
of Consideration, 54 L.Q. REv. 233 (1938); Hepple, Intention to Create Legal Rela-
tions, 28 CAmB. LJ. 122 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hepple].
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Hence the insistence upon bargains. But what then of the idea that the
law will not look into the adequacy of the consideration unless there
be a suggestion of fraud or similarly questionable conduct? That
seems to make nonsense of the whole idea that consideration is meant
to underline the commercial character of contract. So too with the
notion of good (though not valuable) consideration. And the ab-
surdities of Pinnel's case, accepted by Foakes v. Beer, emphasize the
artificiality of the whole common law concept of consideration. It is
hard to argue that the purpose of consideration, whatever its legal def-
inition may be,17 is to ensure that the law is only concerned with truly
commercial, meaningful transactions. Two other matters make such
a suggestion even more questionable. In the first place, there are sev-
eral transactions which the man in the street would undoubtedly con-
sider to be truly commercial but which are given no effect by the law,
for example wagers. In the second place, there are cases in which the
courts have stated that consideration is not enough. There must be
an intent to create legal relations, so that even in a truly commercial
situation there may be no contract because the parties expressly or by
implication have repudiated any legal character in respect of their
transaction.' 8  A good example of this in England, until the recent
Industrial Relations Act, 1971,19 was collective bargains between em-
ployers and trade unions.20  A third point may be added. In recent
years, there has been much debate in the English courts on the subject
of exemption or exclusion clauses in contracts. The effect of these in
some appropriate circumstances may be to render a party not liable
for any breach of contract. I have argued elsewhere 2' that if this is
valid and correct, then it would seem that there may be a "contract"
which does not involve, at least on one side, any contractual obligation
or obligations. This is a difficult result to accept, but nonetheless,
possibly an accurate description of the true legal situation.2 2 Yet there
17. Currie v. Misa, L.R. 10 Ex. 153 (1875), provides the classical definition of con-
sideration:
A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other...
Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
18. Hepple, supra note 16, at 127-34; cf. CAL..Avm_ & PERILLo, supra note 7, at 16-
17.
19. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, c. 72, §§ 34-36.
20. See Hepple, supra note 16, at 122-27.
21. Fridman, The Effect of Exclusion Clauses, 7 ALBERTA L. Rnv. 281 (1969).
22. Might this not be considered in the United States an "illusory contract," and




might be consideration, in the strict technical sense, flowing from each
party to the other, without the effect of creating a contract.
In view of all this, how is it possible to argue that the notion of con-
tract is really rooted in commercial convenience or mercantile ideas?
I would prefer to view it as a totally artificial concept which, to quote
Maitland's famous phrase in another context, is one long suppressio
veri, suggestio falsi.23  What, then, is so sacrosanct about the doctrine
of consideration that should make us pause before we repudiate it as
the basis of contractual obligation? It might be possible to justify ad-
herence to a well-developed concept of the common law if it could be
said to transcribe into legal terms the realities of the marketplace and
of everyday life generally. In fact, as is well known, there are many
instances of commercial transactions, apart from those already men-
tioned, where the doctrine of consideration is not observed, yet com-
mercial men transact business in a binding way. I instance the
whole field of commercial letters of credit, which has always caused
problems for lawyers, and particularly academic lawyers, from the
standpoint of rationalizing commercial credit practices with the doc-
trine of consideration.2 4  Neither is the doctrine of consideration ob-
served in the composition of a debtor with his creditors, whereby the
normal effects of bankruptcy are ousted.25  The latter is a clear breach
of the rule in Pinnel's case or Foakes v. Beer, yet it has been accepted
as creating binding obligations. It almost begins to look as if the doc-
trine of consideration is, in Shakespeare's words, "more honoured in
the breach than in the observance thereof." Why, therefore, insist up-
on such an artificial "bargain" theory to provide the basis for a law of
contract, when it becomes either a Procrustean bed or a doctrine that
must be swept under the carpet when convenience otherwise dictates?
II
I am aware that there is no unanimity on the undesirability of bas-
ing contractual obligation upon the notion of consideration. Twenty-
five years ago, for example, Professor Page, writing in the Wisconsin
Law Review, extolled the virtues of the modem common law of con-
sideration, and repudiated any suggestion that it should be overthrown
23. F. MAiTLAND, EQT'rY 82 (rev. ed. 1936).
24. A. DAvIS, THE LAW RELATING TO COMMERCIAL LETERS OF CREDIT (2d ed.
1954); Davis, The Relationship Between Banker and Seller Under a Confirmed Credit,
52 L.Q. REv. 225 (1936); Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 HA~v. L. REv. 1 (1918).
25. G. TIETEL, THE LAW OF CoNTnAcr 102-03 (3d ed. 1970); CAw tARi & IN-
RILLO, supra note 7, at 125-26.
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in favor of some new-fangled approach which would involve starting all
over again "with the uncertain light of a few vague, new, untried prin-
ciples to guide us."'2 6  This could necessitate having different principles
for contracts concerning land, contracts regarding goods, and contracts
dealing with work and labor. The implicit suggestion is that this
would be unsatisfactory. Personally, there seems nothing inherently
unsatisfactory in such a differentiation. It might be argued that in
many respects there does exist at the present time, even with the doc-
trine of consideration in full operation, some differentiation among
those classes of contracts Professor Page mentioned. At least in Eng-
land (though not in the United States or Canada) there are distinc-
tions resulting from the repeal of the Statute of Frauds. These re-
sult from the need for a writing in respect to, e.g., contracts con-
cerning land, whereas other contracts can be oral.2 7  Different types of
contracts have different implied terms as a matter of law, e.g., a con-
tract for the sale of goods (in respect to which there are statutory im-
plied terms), and contracts for work and labor. Different types of con-
tracts attract different remedies; for example, specific performance is
allowed for contracts involving land and sometimes goods, but never
contracts for services. There may be some underlying general con-
tractual principles applicable to all categories of contract, but that is
not to say that the law of contract is entirely homogeneous. Why cavil
then at possible, further differences that might emerge from any move-
ment away from consideration as the basis of contract.
Much more recently, in an inaugural lecture in Australia, Professor
Atiyah has expressed the view that "to talk of the abolition of the doc-
trine of consideration is nonsensical. Consideration means a reason
for the enforcement of a promise."28  While Professor Atiyah is not as
loathe as Professor Page was to amend or develop the law, his general
thesis, as I understand it, seems to be that restatement of the existing
law will engender such needed development; that when properly under-
stood and applied in the light of modem social and economic develop-
ments, the current law of consideration (which orthodoxy has ossified
in undesirable shapes and meanings) can be made to perform the prop-
er task of any doctrine that is required to provide the basis for contrac-
26. Page, Consideration: Genuine and Synthetic, 1947 Wis. L. REV. 483, 513.
27. In Canada and the United States certain other contracts also may have to be
in writing or evidenced by a note or memorandum, e.g., contracts for the sale of goods
whose value exceeds a certain amount.




tual obligation. If he is correct, there would be little or no need for
fundamental change in the law as and when the Law Commission in
England produces the codification of the law of contract upon which
it is now working. It is relevant to point out that Professor Atiyah
was one of those who worked with the Law Commission to such end.
Hence what he writes may be significant in that it represents pub-
licly the views of one who, as it were privately, may be very in-
fluential in the development of English law (and, thereby, possibly,
the law in Canada and the United States-in the same way that the
American Law Institute's Restatements have had some effect upon
common law jurisdictions outside America).
Despite such strong support for the present approach of Anglo-
American common law to the problem of identifying the basis or
foundation of contractual obligation, with all that flows therefrom (and
I would freely admit that there is probably even greater accord among
the "silent majority" of lawyers and academicians in favor of not tam-
pering with the doctrines that centuries of effort have evolved and re-
fined), it is neither rash nor irresponsible to suggest that at the present
juncture in the historical evolution of our common law, the time may
be ripe for re-evaluation of the doctrine of consideration in respect to
contract, and an examination of the possibility that a wider, jurispru-
dentially different basis for contractual obligation can be admitted into
the law without causing too great a tear in its "seamless web."2  This
is not to say that any such suggestions will meet with universal, or even
widespread approval. On the contrary, generations of conservatism,
rigid adherence to the doctrine. of precedent (which has been man-
handled in all kinds of strange ways by writers on this subject in order
to produce innovation without destruction of the doctrine itself),
and a profound positivist, restrictive, and academically inspired or con-
ceived (though not, curiously enough, a practical or realistic) commer-
cial approach to the law, will undoubtedly operate to bar any attempt
to modify the law by the introduction of more abstract, less concrete,
and more fluid concepts. In saying this, I recognize the strictly logical
objections to any change. In this regard, I would not join with cer-
tain academic writers who have argued in favor of different views as
to the nature and basis of contractual obligation by employing, as it
were, "the rules of the game," in other words, by seeking to use and
interpret the authorities in support of their arguments, not dismissing
29. I am aware that Maitland used this expression about history, 1 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 1 (2d ed. 1898), but I think it tan also
be used in reference to the law.
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or attacking them, but endeavoring to show that, while valid and bind-
ing, they have been misunderstood and, therefore, incorrectly applied
so as to bar certain otherwise acceptable and desirable developments.
I eschew such, to me, in the present context, unworthy methods of ap-
proach. Rather, I would acknowledge that the cases may be against
the point of view I am advocating, but the time has come to repudiate
the cases and accept that, for the amelioration of the law-once it be
accepted that this is both desirable and possible-there is a case for
taking a new line and cutting off the links with the past.
III
An important, and in the present context, a very relevant develop-
ment that has occurred in recent years, is the movement toward a greater
assimilation of, or at least closer association between, obligations aris-
ing out of contract and those arising out of tortious conduct. This
is not to say that the common law is accepting the notion of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes, expressed many times, notably in his correspondence with
Sir Frederick Pollock30 (and subjected to heavy criticism from what
might be termed an unexpected source, in an article by the then Regius
Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, Professor Buckland 3l) to the ef-
fect that a contract is only an undertaking to pay damages if it is broken
or unfulfilled, rather like the obligation to pay damages if one commits
a tort. I do not think that, for reasons of principle as well as logic,
the common law would agree to any such view of what is, or was in-
volved, in a contractual obligation. Nor do I think that it would be ac-
curate to do so with all respect to the memory of an outstanding jurist
and judge. It would be wrong to assimilate contractual and tortious
obligations in accordance with the views of Justice Holmes because, as
Pollock and Buckland explained, Holmes' view (1) disappoints rea-
sonable expectations; (2) is inconsistent with the law of specific per-
formance; (3) is inconsistent with the doctrine that anticipatory re-
fusal to perform is a breach; (4) is inconsistent with the rules concern-
ing frustration; (5) makes a misleading parallel between "committing a
tort" and "committing a contract." The more detailed and scholarly
discussion by Buckland, which draws upon the author's broad know-
ledge and understanding of Roman law, must be read to appreciate the
full force of these criticisms. In the present context, hopefully, it will
30. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTns 21, 79, 110 (M. Howe ed. 1961); 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETIERs 55, 200, 233 (M. Howe ed. 1961); 0. HOLMES JR., THP COMMON
LAW 300-301 (1881); Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903).
31. Buckland, The Nature of Contractual Obligation, 8 CAMB.L.J. 247 (1942).
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suffice to point out that the Holmes theory is basically unacceptable.
Nonetheless, it may be hinted that the divergence which occurred in
the history of the common law between contract and tort-even
though they had a common ancestry as historians have shown 3 -
reached its furthest development years ago, perhaps just before the
great case of Donoghue v. Stevenson,33 and the current movement of the
law is toward a greater connection, or, if it be preferred, towards a
closer relationship between the two sources of personal obligation be-
tween individuals. There are still potential areas of difference. One
such is in respect to remoteness of damage. In The Heron 11,1' a case
concerned with remoteness of damage when a contract of affreightment
was breached, several members of the House of Lords pointed out that
the measure of damages in tort was not the same as in contract. 5 As
Lord Upjohn said:
[T]he claim for damages must be the natural consequence
of the breach or in the contemplation of both parties: but in tort a
different test has been adopted . . . . that the tortfeasor is liable for
any damage which he can reasonably foresee may happen as a result of
the breach however unlikely it may be, unless it can be brushed aside
as far fetched. 36
The reason why this difference has arisen was explained thus by Lord
Pearce:
In the case of contract two parties, usually with some knowledge of
one another, deliberately undertake mutual duties. They have the op-
portunity to define clearly in respect of what they shall and shall not
be liable. The law has to say what shall be the boundaries of their
liability where this is not expressed, defining that boundary in relation
to what has been expressed and implied. In tort two persons, usually
unknown to one another, find that the acts or utterances of one have
collided with the rights of the other, and the court has to define what
is the liability for the ensuing damage, whether it shall be shared, and
how far it extends. If one tries to find a concept of damages which
will fit both these different problems there is a danger of distorting
the rules to accomodate one or the other and of producing a rule that
is satisfactory for neither.3
7
32. See S. MHsoM, IsTOwCAL FOUNDATION oF TnE COMMON LAW (1969), par-
ticularly chapter 12, and the references cited at 416.
33. [1932] A.C. 562.
34. [1969] 1 A.C. 350.
35. Id. at 385-86, 411, 413, 422.
36. Id. at 422.
37. Id. at 413-14.
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Apart from the issue of remoteness, there are fundamental distinctions
with respect to the ways in which tortious and contractual obligations
arise or are created, their scope and content, the available remedies,
and so on. Nonetheless, I would suggest that the gap between obliga-
tions arising ex delicto and those arising ex contractu (if it is permitted
to use Romanistic language) is narrowing. This, I see, as a fertile field
for the growth of new ideas about the nature of contract.
At the same time certain changes have occurred in recent years in
relation to the attitude of the common law to economic or financial
loss which is not the result of physical damage whether it be damage
to person or damage to property. Between the common law in the
United States and the common law in England (and other parts of the
Commonwealth), there may have been divergent developments. I
speak here really of the Way things have changed in England, or in jur-
isdictions which are more closely allied to England, such as Canada and
Australia-though it is relevant to point out, as the House of Lords
has recently stated,38 that there is no fundamental reason why common
law countries other than England should adopt the same approach to
some principle of the common law as England. In these matters, how-
ever, I think it is fair to say that there has been some similarity of ap-
proach. Thus the common law has now accepted the possibility of
damages for negligent, non-contractual misrepresentation.8 The orig-
inal decision in this regard has been subjected to some limitation by
the Privy Council, on appeal from Australia, in the case of Mutual Life
Assurance Ltd. v. Evatt.40  In that case, over the powerful dissent of
two members of the Board, Lords Reid and Morris, who were also
participants in the earlier House of Lords case, it was held that the only
circumstances in which such misrepresentation would give rise to liabil-
ity were when the maker of the statement, in Lord Diplock's words,
made it [the statement] in the ordinary course of his business or pro-
fession and . . . the subject-matter of the statement called for the exer-
cise of some qualification, skill or competence not possessed by the
ordinary reasonable man, to which the maker of the statement was
38. Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027.
39. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465 (1963). This case
has been followed in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The United Kingdom has,
by statute, been even more expansive, giving damages for negligent misrepresentation
and, in certain circumstances, placing on the defendant the burden of proving a belief
that the representation was true, as well as prohibiting clauses that would exclude or
restrict liability. See Misrepresentation Act 1967, c. 7.
40. [1971] A.C. 793 (P.C. 1970) (Austl.).
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known by the recipient to lay claim by reason of his engaging in that
business or profession.
41
Notwithstanding such qualification on the scope of liability for neg-
ligent misrepresentation, another breach in the old privity of contract
doctrine, or if you prefer, in the dichotomy between contract and tort,
which was bridged only where there was fraud, or some physical dam-
age (and that only after 1932), has now been effected. An offshoot
of that breach is reflected in cases which suggest, albeit haltingly, and
in a very restricted way, that for negligence which interferes with the
damnified party's ability to perform contracts, or to conduct his busi-
ness so as to make a profit, there may be a remedy even though there
is no contract between the wrongdoer and the injured party. 2 In other
words, the realization is growing that the law should take cognizance
of economic loss which is effected by non-fraudulent conduct, where
the normal requirements of a contract between the parties, in particu-
lar the essential factor of consideration, are absent. Once upon a
time, the common law barred completely and without qualification
the way toward a remedy for loss resulting from non-fraudulent con-
duct in the absence of consideration between the parties. Since con-
sideration did not, and does not have to be adequate (as long as it
is, in the cant phrase, "sufficient"), it was possible to "buy" protec-
tion from non-fraudulent wrongdoing at the cost of a peppercorn; in
the absence of anything so humble or worthless, the victim of such con-
duct or misconduct was left without any recourse to the law. At least
such absurdity has been eradicated from the law of England (and else-
where), even though the developments in this respect may not have
gone as far as some lawyers would have them go. But the illogicality
and stupidity which was once pointed out by Lord Devlin48 no longer
find a home in the bosom of the law of tort.
It is interesting to note, however, that when the House of Lords con-
sidered the notion of liability for negligent, non-contractual misrepre-
sentation, their Lordships went out of their way to insist that such liab-
ility could only be founded upon a "special" relationship between
the parties that was akin to, or practically the same as, a contractual re-
lationship. 44 What it would seem they were thinking of, as later cases
41. Id. at 802.
42. S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. WJ. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1970] 3 W.L.R.
694 (C.A.); British Celanese Ltd. v. A.H. Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd., [1969] 1 W.L.R.
959 (Q.B.). See also G. FRMMN, STuDms nr CANADAN BusINESs LAw 501-03
(1971); Harvey, Economic Loss and Negligence, 50 CAN. B. REV. 580 (1972).
43. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1964] A.C. 465, 517 (1963).
44. Id. at 486, 502, 514, 539.
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indicate, and as must be taken to have been emphasized by the rul-
ing in Mutual Life Assurance Ltd. v. Evatt,4 5 is in effect a contract
minus consideration, i.e., without even the traditional peppercorn. In
other words, the more recent development in regard to negligence is
to draw together the notions of tort and of contract, rather than to dif-
ferentiate between them. What I would like to suggest is that if we
examine the essence of the relationship that was in the minds of the
judges in these cases, we find that what they were searching for, in
order to enforce, was something in the nature of a "serious" promise,
an undertaking or statement that was meant to be acted upon, intended
to be taken at face value by the recipient, designed to have a causal
effect upon the latter's conduct, and, therefore, foreseeably likely to
produce damage if something went wrong. And to produce damage,
i.e., to cause harm, in this context, means to inflict or result in loss of
a financial nature. From what will emerge later, it will be seen that, in
my opinion, this notion of "serious" promise could be the foundation
of contractual liability generally, as it is the foundation of this new
kind of tortious liability, and for very much the same reasons and
with the same justification.
IV
If recent advances in tort law have eradicated illogicality and stu-
pidity, these defects can still be found flourishing within the boundaries
of the law of contract. The problem, in its precise nature, may be dif-
ferent; in essence it is the same. As long as the doctrine of considera-
tion is enforced in all its glory, and the law turns its back on any at-
tempt to qualify that doctrine's operation by more equitable and flex-
ible notions, it will be impossible to protect all those who legitimately
might think that their situation deserves legal recognition and protec-
tion.
Now it is correct to state that, even in this respect, some change has
emerged in England and other Commonwealth countries in recent
years, in the past twenty-five to be exact, since the decision of Denning
I., as he then was, in the High Trees case.46 That case was not en-
tirely novel. In fact, what the learned judge did was to resuscitate and
apply some older principles laid down by the House of Lords in Hughes
v. Metropolitan Ry. 47 in the latter quarter of the nineteenth cen-
45. [1971] A.C. 793 (P.C. 1970) (Austl.).
46. Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1947] K.B. 130
(1946).
47. 2 App. Cas. 439 (1877).
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tury. I have dealt at length with those and other cases, at least down
to 1957, elsewhere. 48  In effect, what that case decided was that if
there existed certain rights and liabilities between the parties arising out
of contract, a statement by one which purported to waive his rights
(or remove or reduce the liabilities of the other, whether totally or to
a limited extent) could be relied upon by the other (the promisee as it
were) if he acted upon it to his detriment, even if the original promisor,
who made the statement, subsequently attempted to repudiate his rep-
resentation and enforce his original strict legal rights. Hence, in the
High Trees case itself, a landlord who agreed to waive payment of the
full amount of rent originally agreed upon could not afterwards claim
the full amount. It is still a matter of debate as to why this was so
in that particular case,49 but the general doctrine was clear before
1945 and has not fundamentally altered (although its application
may have been strained from time to time).50 There have been later
cases, 51 culminating in a dictum by the present Lord Chancellor
(Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone) in a House of Lords decision52
to the effect that the doctrine may require some reconsideration and
possibly limitation.
There have also been cases in Canada which adopt and apply the
principles set out in the English cases, and help to reveal the short-
comings of this departure. 3 The chief of these is the suggestion to be
found in the English cases, which appears to have been accepted very
recently by the Supreme Court of Canada, 54 that the concept of estop-
pel, whether it be called promissory, equitable, or quasi-estoppel (set
out in the Hughes case, the High Trees decision, and all the other
cases, at first instance, the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords, or
48. Fridman, Promissory Estoppel, 35 CAN. B. REv. 279, 291 et seq. (1957).
49. Cf. G. TRmTEL, ThE LAw oF CONTRACT 105 (3d ed. 1970).
50. See, e.g., D & C Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617 (C.A.).
51. WJ. Alan & Co. v. El Nasr Export & Import Co., [19721 2 All E. R. 127
(C.A.); Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326 (P.C.). For ref-
erence to Commonwealth decisions, see Jackson, Estoppel As A Sword, 81 L.Q. REv.
223, 243 (1965).
52. Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd. S.A. v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co.,
[19721 A.C. 741, 758.
53. Cull v. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd., 20 D.L.R.3d 360 (1971); Sohio Petroleum
Co. v. Weyburn Security Co., 13 D.L.R.3d 340 (1970); Frankel Structural Steel Ltd.
v. Golden Holdings Ltd., 5 D.L.R.3d 15 (1969); Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v.
Murdoch, 4 D.L.R.3d 629 (1969); Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v. Paddon-Hughes Decv.
Co., 3 D.L.R.3d 10 (1969); John Burrows Ltd. v. Subsurface Surveys Ltd., 68 D.L.R.
2d 354 (1968).
54. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. v. Paddon-Hughes Dev. Co., 12 D.L.R.3d 247, 251-52
(1970).
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the Privy Council), operates as a "shield" not as a "sword."" In
other words, the doctrine can be brought into play to affect, modify,
qualify, or restrict the operation of strict legal rights, as against a party
whose representation has induced the other party to a transaction to
act in reliance thereon to his detriment. But it cannot be employed as
the basis of an action. To allow that would be to permit "contracts"
to emerge or be created without consideration-and that, as everyone
knows, will not do! Thus estoppel can result in waiver or variation
of a contract, or a term in a contract (which has been properly pro-
duced as a consequence of consideration moving from the promisee in
accordance with all the strict rules of the law). It cannot result in
the formation of a totally new contract, even though the "parties" to the
representation which forms the basis of the estoppel (if it be permitted
to refer to them in such terms) may have intended their "transac-
tion" to have some kind of force, possibly even legal in effect, and had
acted under such beliefs over a period of time. The idea that estoppel
is a shield and not a sword has been attacked in the pages of the Law
Quarterly Review, in a learned article which seeks to show that the cases
have been misinterpreted and really allow what all the subsequent au-
thorities have stated is not permissible, namely, the use of estoppel or
representation as to the future as the basis of a truly contractual re-
lationship or obligation despite the apparent absence of consideration
in the strict technical sense."6 Professor Atiyah has also expressed the
view that the earlier cases have been misunderstood with the result that
"virtually all modem academic (and much judicial) discussion of prom-
issory estoppel has been entirely beside the point.'' 57 I would not go so
far with either writer. I am prepared to accept that, in the light of the
nineteenth century cases in England, and the way they have been in-
terpreted and applied, it is not possible to found a contract upon an
estoppel. Indeed, in discussing the nature of agency and the creation
of the agency relationship, in respect of which there has also been much
debate upon the difference between contract or consent and estoppel,
I have also made it clear that while the legal relationship of principal
and agent may arise for some purposes as a result of representation,
i.e., estoppel, there is in some respects no true assimilation between
agency created by contract (or consent) and agency arising by virtue
of an estoppel. Indeed, where agency by estoppel is involved, there
55. Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 224-25 (C.A.).
56. Jackson, Estoppel As A Sword (pts. 1 & 2), 81 L.Q. REv. 84, 223 (1968).




may be no obligations in the normal sense between "principal" and
"agent." There may simply be a relationship (and obligations) be-
tween principal and third party (usually for the protection of the lat-
ter).58 Thus, in what is clearly a business or commercial context, I
think that the law makes a distinction between contractual obligations
or relations and those emerging from some type of estoppel. Similarly,
I believe that efforts to establish that the modem doctrine of promissory,
equitable, or quasi-estoppel can be understood or treated so as to per-
mit the creation of contractual obligations exactly of the same nature as
those arising more "normally," are misguided. I do not think that
English law has accepted, or can be construed as accepting, that the
doctrine of consideration can be, or has been, overthrown by a "side-
wind" (as it was once put).59
By way of comparison, in the United States, there would appear to
be stronger authority, both academic and judicial, for the proposition
that the kind of conduct which would come within the scope of the
Hughes and High Trees cases in England could lead to an action being
brought to enforce the claims of one relying upon the statement or
promise in question. The foundation for such a view is the Restate-
ment of Contracts, § 90. In its first formulation, which I have dis-
cussed elsewhere, 60 and which perhaps emanated from cases concerned
with charitable gifts, gifts of land, and certain other transactions,"1
this doctrine was stated thus:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part
of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise.62
This seems to have met with approval and adoption by courts in sev-
eral states; to the extent of permitting actions where agency was gratui-
tous, which, prior to the Restatement, meant that the principal could
not sue if the agent failed to perform at all;6" where expenses were in-
58. G. FRIMAN, LAW OF AGENcY 68-69 (3d ed. 1971).
59. Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 220 (C.A.).
60. Fridman, Promissory Estoppel, 35 CAN. B. REv. 279, 282-90 (1957).
61. S. WmILsoN, CONTRAars 607-19 (3d ed. 1957); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel.
Principles From Precedents, (pts. 1 & 2), 50 MIcH. L. REv. 639, 873 (1952); cI.
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U.
PA. L. REv. 459 (1950); Goble, Trends in the Theory of Contracts in the United
States, 11 Tus. L. Rv. 412, 414-17 (1937); Laidlaw, Consideration and Promissory
Estoppel, 5 LINCOLN L. Rv. 1 (1932).
62. RE.STATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1932).
63. Northern Commercial Co. v. United Airmotive, 101 F. Supp. 169 (D. Alas.
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curred in reliance upon promises as to future action such as the grant.
ing of a franchise; 64 where promises were made as to future pensions."0
Some writers appear to have suggested that the effect of this provision
in the Restatement was to create an alternative possible basis for a con-
tractual relationship, namely the notion of detriment of injurious re-
liance, which has been espoused and elaborated upon by Roscoe
Pound6 6and Morris Cohen.17  As related in one textbook, "This overly
conceptual approach has very likely hindered full judicial acceptance of
the doctrine."6" Hence also the suggestion by Seavey that the true
basis for an action is tort not contract6a Perhaps for these and simi-
lar reasons, the Restatement, Second § 90, reformulated this doctrine
in this way:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac.
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the proise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.vQ-
It has been suggested that just as the original Restatement gave great
impetus to promissory estoppel, it may be expected that the second Re-
statement with its liberalization of the doctrine will give. added impetus
to the utilization of the doctrine as a substitute for consideration (or as
the basis of a cause of action that is neither contract, tort, Aor quasi-
contract).71
With great respect, this seems somewhat eager. It would be pre-
sumptuous of me to attempt to expound the law which is stated and
1951); Siegel v. Speer & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923),; Comfort v. McCoxkle, 268
N.Y.S. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1933); cf. Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 N.E.24 40
(N.Y. 1959).
64. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. White, 39.8
S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis.
1965). For a discussion of these problems, see Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE LJ. 343, 357-65, 376-87 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Henderson].
65. CALAMAni & PminrO, supra note 7, at 183-85.
66. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCrION TO TMh PMLosoPHY oF LAw 151 et seq. (1954).
67. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HIARv. L Rnv. 553, 578-80 (1933); cf. Seavey,
Reliance Upon Gratuitous and Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. Rrv. 913 (1951).
68. CAumArs- & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 185.
69. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratultou, and Other Condu ct, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 913
(1951),.
70. REsTATEMENT (SEcomN) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (Tent, Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973).
71. CALAm.sx & PEwILLO, supra note 7, at 186. The authors also stated: "[Olrdi-
narily the term promissory estoppel is used in Teference to the formation of a con-




applied by courts in the United States. Such limited reading as I
have been able to undertake in this area, however, does not convince
me that courts in the United States are as willing to go to the extremes
suggested above as might be hoped by some, if not all writers. In a lim-
ited class of cases, and here the emphasis is upon the word "limited,"
it may be conceded that American courts are prepared to recognize an
alternative method of creating a binding obligation (possibly to be
dignified by the appellation "contractual") even though no considera-
tion in the classical sense is present or can be manufactured as between
promisor and promisee.7 2 But it is by no means clear that this is a
doctrine of general application, or even 'of general acceptance in its lim-
ited form.73  Moreover, as should be evident from what has been said
earlier, those courts that do adopt this kind of approach -seem uncer-
tain, as do some writers, whether the source -of this obligation is per-
ceived 'as the law of contract, tort, quasi-contract, or indeed, some-
thing else, which might even be called a kind of general residual equit-
able jurisdiction of the court.
74
I would rather eschew any suggestion that such obligations arise
outside the law of contract or tort, and can have some different basis,
particularly any suggestion that the whole thing is a concoction of
'equity, in any sense of that term. I would prefer to ask whether any
sutch obligation is contractual or tortious, since, probably, out of such
areas of the law a sound reasonable basis for such enlargement of the
notion of contract can be extracted.
What I mean to suggest by this question is that the basis of the re-
'sultant obligation, whatever it is, and to whatever extent it may be, is
not that there is a contract between the parties akin to what may be
called a "normal" contract between parties which creates normal con-
tractual relations and obligations inter se, but that it takes on more of
the nature of a tortious duty, the breach of which produces something
72. See Potter v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1932), where Judge Learned
Hand said, "'[Promissory estoppel' is now a recognized species of consideration.
.' Id. at 675; cf. Henderson, supra note '64, at 345-57.
73. See Henderson, supra -note 64, at 346.
74. The language 'of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 suggests that the
source is equitable in nature. Some cases suggest the same. See, e.g., Feinberg v.
Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb.
1898); cf. Henderson, supra note 64, at 379-80. Perhaps this explains the connection
between this doctrine and the notion of "good faith" in contracts. See Summers,
"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales .Provisions of The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 223-27 (1968); Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contra-
hendo, Bargaining in Good 'Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HPv. L. Rav. 401 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kessler & Fine].
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akin to tortious liability. Indeed, the language which some writers
utilize to describe and discuss this kind of relationship and the obliga-
tions, rights, and duties which stem from it, appears to acknowledge
the tortious origins, if not the current tort overtones, of the whole con-
cept. Now it is true that the idea of detriment, which is vital in this
context (although it may sometimes be expressed differently, in terms
of injurious reliance), smacks of the very similar idea of detriment in
relation to consideration-which suggests contract rather than tort. Nev-
ertheless, it appears that the notion of detriment is more readily attri-
butable to the earlier tort foundations of assumpsit than to the later
contract ideas inherent in the notion of consideration which developed
from the idea of quid pro quo which is to be found in cases dealing with
the subsequent development of assumpsit into a general contractual
remedy. There is an air of (if you will forgive the term) quasi-fraud
about detriment in relation to promissory estoppel. This seems to be
inherent in the way in which writers, cases, and both versions of the Re-
statement uniformly contend that this method of creating an obligation
is exceptional and can only arise in circumstances which require the
judgment that it would be unfair not to accord recognition to this kind
of transaction or conduct. In other words, what the law and the
courts are doing is preventing fraud, or impropriety, by making the
gratuitous promisor perform his gratuitous undertaking without sliding
out from under his self-imposed, perhaps unilateral, obligation by re-
pelling any susequent action or threat of litigation through the incanta-
tion of the mumbo-jumbo of consideration.75
In this sense, there is a close connection between the rise of promis-
sory estoppel in the United States and the emergence of a remedy for
negligent misrepresentation which to some extent, as already seen, has
evolved in England, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Stripping
these artificial terms aside, the bare facts of such cases would reveal
that the representor has undertaken some kind of duty, which he is not
allowed to break, or can only break on pain of paying damages. In
one instance the duty is treated as tortious, and the measure of dam-
ages is calculated in accordance with tort principles; in the other, the
duty is regarded as contractual, and presumably the measure of dam-
ages is contractual (as it is when the action is for breach of the implied
warranty of authority that arises where someone acts as an agent when
75. Cf. Henderson, supra note 64, at 377-78 and cases there cited for the American
view to such effect




in fact he is not, even though, as argued elsewhere, there is no consid-
eration for such warranty, and the duty and liability that arise cannot
truly be said to be contractual).7" If it is perfectly respectable to pro-
vide a tort remedy for negligent misrepresentation without a contract
to substantiate any liability for breach of duty, why should it be utterly
reprehensible and quite out of keeping with principle or authority
(which the English and Canadian, but possibily not the American cases,
always say) to allow a remedy for breach of a gratuitous promise or
undertaking where there is no tort, in the strict sense of fraud or negli-
gence? This, it is respectfully suggested, is simply to revive and apply
in a new context the old distinction between contract and tort obliga-
tions and liabilities which has already been dealt body blows in Eng-
land first by the decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson,"8 and more re-
cently by that in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.79 Now
it is true that in the latter case, and as seen even more recently in the
Evatt0 decision, the scope of such non-contractual liability was limited,
perhaps more severely than was necessary, and perhaps not in a man-
ner in strict accordance with the views of some of the members of the
House of Lords in the Heller case (as witness the dissent of two of
them in the Evatt case). Even accepting such limitations, however,
there would appear to be no great distinction between granting a tort
remedy and permitting a remedy in contract. To insist upon such a
distinction, and to differentiate cases on such a basis constitutes a
stubborn attempt to enforce delineations and demarcations with re-
spect to legal rights and duties, and the liabilities that arise therefrom,
that are long since outmoded. It is to insist upon a rigid categorization
of the law into separate, wholly insulated compartments. In effect,
it is to resuscitate the forms of action long after they have gone. The
old adage of Maitland, that the forms of action are dead but they still
rule us from their graves, has surely been given its quietus in modern
times by more than one judge. Most notably the judgment of Lord
Denning, if not the whole Court of Appeal in England, in Letang v.
Cooper"' in relation to trespass, case, and negligence, is evidence of the
unwillingness of English judges to have their freedom of action delimited
and controlled by archaic notions of what is one tort and what is an-
other. Similarly, can it not be argued that courts should not be forced
77. G. FRmmAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY 179-83 (3d ed. 1971). The proper meas-
ure of damage is a matter of debate.
78. [1932] A.C. 562.
79. [1964] A.C. 465.
80. Mutual Life Assurance Ltd. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 793 (P.C. 1970) (Austl.).
81. [19651 1 Q.B. 232 (C.A.).
1974] ,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to treat a fact situation as either contract or tort, and apply the strict
rules of the appropriate classification, to the disadvantage of the litigant
and the frustration of justice? Instead should they not be able to apply
whatever rules, from whatever source, that they consider to be most
relevant and helpful in determining the issue between litigating parties?
If this is conceded, then it surely must follow that any distinction be-
tween a tortious misrepresentation and a contractual or promissory
one is unjustified. 2
It might be argued that there is a fundamental factual, as opposed
to juridical difference, which ultimately does lead to a juridical one;
namely, that in the tort cases, the misrepresentation is as to present fact
(and therefore can be treated as a source of liability in tort), whereas
in the other instances, the misrepresentation is as to some future con-
duct, and therefore is contract or nothing, i.e., must be made in a con-
tractual context if it is to have effect. My answer is as follows. In the
tort case, the real basis of the liability is not so much the making of
the representation, though of course its occurrence is essential as an in-
gredient of liability, but rather the detrimental reliance thereon by the
injured party. In the same way, the basis of liability in promissory es-
toppel cases is not the representation, though again, the making of the
representation is fundamental and vital, but the injurious reliance there-
on by the "promisee" (which is, indeed, the basic American view, as I
understand it). Looked at in this way, which, it is suggested, is as legit-
imate a way of looking at the situations as any other, there is a greater
similarity between them than would appear from a comparison be-
tween statements of present fact and statements of future intention. If
this means that promissory estoppel cases take on even more the flavor
of tort, in order to give them some legitimacy as instances of liability
or obligation, then I would not quarrel with such an approach (though
the notion of "reliance" in the United States does not appear to have
been treated from the point of view of the law of tort, save, possibly,
by some writers in relation to some specific instances of its use, e.g.,
cases of gratuitous agency). My argument basically is that the older
borders between contractual and tortious obligations (in the sense of
the juridical origins or bases of such obligations) are becoming more
and more blurred and eventually may even disappear. If recognition
of such new forms of "contractual" obligation will encourage and as-
sist such disappearance, then there is an additional reason for promot-
ing such recognition.
82. For an interesting discussion of the classification of the law, see Tim DIVIsIoN




In this regard, it is perhaps apposite to ask, what are the purposes
which a law of contract should achieve? A technical answer might in-
volve such ideas as clarity, certainty, convenience, and consistency. I
am by no means sure that the common law as it has developed to date
has achieved all, indeed possibly, any of these. When one reflects upon
the mysteries of mistake, the tangled web of exemption clauses, the
rigidity and technicalities of the doctrine of privity, and the checkered
history of the law relating to frustration, the realization soons dawns
that the common law has not significantly succeeded in producing a
law of contract that commends itself to the business community (to
say nothing of the ordinary man in the street) as being a body of easily
digestible, acceptable rules. Not all the blame for this can be laid at
the feet of the doctrine of consideration; however, I feel that in part that
doctrine has helped to bring about some of the unhappier effects of
our law of contract.
A less technical, more philosophical way of answering the question
posed above is in terms of the ultimate social and economic functions
to be served by a law of contract. There are many ways of putting
this. Let me cite only two, somewhat old-fashioned statements. The
first is by Kohler: "It is the province of the law of obligations ....
to provide that wealth shall come either directly or indirectly into the
possession of those who can employ it."'83 The other is by Sheldon
Amos:
The phenomenon of Contract as a social characteristic implies that
men have found out that they can rely not only on their own conduct
in the future, but on that of each other, and that they can safely guide
their present conduct, under the assurance that others will do or not do
hereafter certain acts specifically described.84
With this compare the following by Pound:
So much of everyday life depends upon reliance on promises that
an everyday dependence loses its effectiveness if promises are to be per-
formed only when it suits the promisor's convenience. A promise
which imposes no risk on the promisor belongs to the prediction theory.
It is not a promise. A promisee reasonably expects a promise to be
performed even if it hurts. Why relieve only the promisor? Is not
the promisee frustrated if he cannot have what was promised him? 5
83. J. KOHLER, THE PHILosopHY OF LAw 134 (1969).
84. S. AMos, A SYsTmnc VIEw OF THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 177 (1872).
85. P. PoUND, AN INMRODUCTION TO THE PILOsoPHy OF LW 167-68 (1954).
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I realize that it is unfair to snatch a few, scattered comments from only
a selected number of writers. To be absolutely correct, a full exam-
ination of all writings on the subject ought to be at the very least at-
tempted. That is impossible in the present context, nor would it be
entirely desirable even if it were possible. My purpose is simply to
show that there are many, varied understandings of what ought to be
achieved by a law of contract in a modem society. Is the right answ6r
to be sought among men of commerce? The man in the street? The
practicing lawyer, who sees many of the by-products of commercial
enterprise in the sense of the frustration and unhappiness of his clients,
or the loss of expected profit or wealth? The scholar discussing legal
ideals in abstraction? Or the non-legal philosopher who wishes to en-
sure a certain standard of ethical behavior? Everything depends upon
whether one wishes to stress the practical as opposed to the ideal. The
common law, inevitably, at all stages and in most contexts, is an at-
tempt to reach compromise between what is desirable and what is pos-
sible. The danger with the common law, as history has revealed, is that
the desiderata of one period do not necessarily remain the same for
another. Hence what has been accepted as possible, involving the re-
jection of something else as impossible, leads to rigidity at a time when
the hitherto impossible may have become possible by reason of a
changed outlook on the part of society, as to what is desirable and neces-
sary. The law of contract has become locked into a position which
it reached at the beginning of the nineteenth century when society
(and indeed business) was very different from what it is today.
American developments have included the recognition that a different
society was involved on that continent, requiring a somewhat different
approach to the law in many respects, notably, for present purposes,
the law of contract. In England, there has not been a similar pressure,
at least to the equivalent extent. Hence, no comparable developments
have taken place. The question is whether further development can
and should occur.
I would suggest that sufficient change has taken place with respect
to the acknowledgement of the purposes of a law of contract in our
times, to merit some reconsideration of its content and, inevitably,
of its underlying basis. In what has been written thus far, I have en-
deavored to show what I think are some alterations that have been mani-
festing themselves in the approach of the law to several closely allied
areas in the hope of indicating that the atmosphere is favorable to
change in other directions. I have pointed out, obliquely at the very
least, the sort of direction which I think the law is beginning to take.
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It is necessary for me to state more clearly where I think it ought to
be going, and the end which it should be seeking to achieve.
VI
The various possible theoretical bases of contractual obligation, of
which some, if not all, have operated at different times in legal history,
have been enunciated and discussed by Cohen in the essay referred to
previously as well as by Pound.8 6 There has been a movement away
from a more philosophical theory, such as the importance of the "will,"
toward a much more mundane explanation such as "bargain" or "equi-
valence." Would it be fair to state that this movement represents the
decline of religious or psychological factors in relation to legal con-
cepts and the rise of monetary ones, which seems in keeping with the
fundamental change in society that occurred with the passing of the
medieval period and the rise of modem business and commerce? If
so, can it be suggested now that, even if there is not a total return to a
previous era, philosophically or otherwise, at least there is a kind of re-
vulsion from the society which emerged between the seventeenth and
early twentieth centuries? And that, in part, this is being manifested
in the feeling that the law should not be as concerned with (a) prop-
erty interests, (b) a financial, or monetary basis of legal concepts, or
(c) so-called "objective" tests which produce What might be termed
a "least common factor" formulation of rights, duties, and liabilities?
Subjectivity, greater personalization of the law and its effects, and
more emphasis upon broader, perhaps more moral standards, can be
seen as factors or ideas which are having more and more influence
upon the development of the law at the present time. The "reasonable
man," the "officious bystander," whose fictitious existence was created
to solve many a knotty legal problem, may well be creatures of a past
legal age, who have outlived their utility and relevance for our modern
legal system. Instead, perhaps we should be paying more attention to
what this particular litigant or participant in the legal process knew,
thought, and understood, not what some imaginary objective stranger
would have known, thought, or understood by what happened or what
was said or written.
If this approach is at all justified, then I would suggest that, in the
present context, it is important and meaningful in that it can explain
why the developed doctrine of consideration will no longer suffice as a
theoretical basis for contractual obligation. That doctrine bears all the
86. See materials cited in footnotes 66 and 67 supra.
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hallmarks of objectivity, the reasonable man, and the officious by-
stander. It represents an attempt to formulate the basis of contract in
terms of how a transaction could be interpreted by an outsider not per-
sonally involved in the intimacies of the transaction, but coming to it
without any knowledge of what actually happened, or what might have
been intended or understood by the parties. Hence the emphasis on
facts and factors which might entitle such an outsider to conclude that
the parties were "serious" and meant to enter into a legal transaction
which should be held binding. A more subjective, personalized ap-
proach would well encourage greater reliance upon, or reference to,
the intentions and understanding of the individual parties.87
Even the extensions, such as they are, to the scope of "obligation"
which have resulted from the American doctrine contained in section
90 of the Restatement of Contracts, would seem to employ or involve
an objective test with respect to their enforcement and ambit. The lan-
guage of the Restatement, certainly as it has been interpreted by
courts in the United States, suggests that whether a promise, though
gratuitious, is to be given some effect, depends upon whether it was
"reasonable" for the alleged promisee to rely upon it. In this respect,
it appears that the courts are attempting to give what might be termed
a "contractual" flavor (in the classical sense of contractual) to this
new phenomenon of the law. It is not different; it is simply a varia-
tion. In contrast, I would suggest, the English cases on promissory
estoppel (and their Commonwealth counterparts) adopt a more subjec-
tive approach. They are concerned with the question of whether this
particular party was misled by this particular defendant into reliance
upon what the latter had represented, so as to result in an estoppel
against the latter in subsequent litigation.
Thus, in my view, at least in the way the common law has developed
in its original home, there is some movement toward greater subjectiv-
ity in respect to the creation of recognition of "obligations." Indeed,
whatever may be the situation in the United States, there is support
for such an approach coming from quite a different marginal area of
the law.
In recent years in Canada (a similar development does not appear
to have emerged in England), several cases have given effect to the
idea that, without a contract in the normal sense, there may arise lia-
bility to compensate someone who has performed services for another
87. For commentary on judicial interference with contract and the decline of the




at that other's request, or with that other's knowledge.88 In none of
these instances, could a true contract be created or constructed out of
the circumstances. Hence the obligation to pay could not be contrac-
tual. It was "quasi-contractual"; it arose because of the unjustified
or unjustifiable enrichment of the person now obliged to compensate.
It was an obligation to make restitution. Yet, in a sense, the situation
was almost a contractual one. The obligation had many contractual
features. What was missing? A formal offer and acceptance? Con-
sideration? A promise to pay? An intent to create legal relations?
All or some of these in most instances. Such lack did not impede the
creation of a binding legal obligation-albeit the precise juridical na-
ture and character of such obligation was novel or unusual. The strict
law of contract was obviously being broken, or if you prefer, over-
reached, outflanked, or finessed. Similarly, it could be argued, why is
it essential to observe the totality of the strict law of contract in other
situations, when the facts indicate that there was every intention to
create an obligation of some sort (perhaps not strictly a legal one in
the customary sense), even though the precise requirements of the law
of contract had not been fulfilled? What is being suggested or requested
is not merely a more flexible view of contractual obligations but a
broader-based outlook upon the nature of legal obligations in general.
The attack upon the formalized, rigid classification of legal situations
that emerged over the centuries has obtained greater impetus in recent
years. Developments in the conflict of laws have revealed that it is by
no means easy to attribute a fact situation to its proper or appropriate
legal category (so as to apply the "right" legal rules to it). Indeed,
there may be no "proper" or "appropriate" legal category, or in fact,
the category which is proper or appropriate for legal system A is not
that which would be proper or appropriate for legal system B. Which
is to "win"? Is it really "winning"? We have grown accustomed to
such complexities, and realize that such differences must be acknowl-
edged and accepted in the interests of justice. Why, then, can the
further step not be taken, namely to acknowledge and accept that such
88. Re Fink, 14 D.L.R.3d 31 (1970); Brownscombe v. Public Trustee of Alberta,
5 D.L.R.3d 673 (1969); Samilo v. Phillips, 69 D.L.R.2d 411 (1968); Re Jacques, 66
D.L.R.2d 447 (1968); Re Reid, 46 D.L.R.2d 32 (1964); Estok v. Heguy, 40 D.L.R.2d
88 (1963); Rowe v. Public Trustee, 38 D.L.R.2d 462 (1963); Morton Constr. Co. v.
City of Hamilton, 31 D.L.R.2d 323 (1961); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. of Canada v.
Eakins Constr. Ltd., 22 D.L.R.2d 465 (1960); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 13 D.L.R.2d 365
(1958); Arding v. Buckton, 6 D.L.R.2d 586 (1956); City of Moncton v. Stephen, 5
D.L.R.2d 722 (1956); Re Murphy, 2 D.L.R.2d 132 (1956); Deglman v. Guaranty Trust
of Canada, 3 D.L.R. 785 (1954); see Angus, Restitution in Canada Since the DegIman
Case, 42 CAN. B. REv. 529 (1964).
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differences can be accommodated within the municipal, or home legal
system, even when there is no conflict of laws situation which neces-
sitates any such accommodation. There comes to mind the famous
dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo to the effect that we are not so paro-
chial as to imagine that what is home-produced is necessarily the best,
and that foreign ideas are ipso facto unacceptable, wrong, to be
shunned and unenforced.
89
Of course I am not speaking of something that is, strictly speaking,
foreign. The ideas of promissory estoppel, and the enforcement of so-
called gratuitous promises, are not imports from another system of
law. They are as indigenous as consideration itself, and they have been
analyzed, supported, and disseminated by such "local" worthies as
Pound and Seavey in the United States, and Lords Wright and Denning
in England. They do, however, bear a greater resemblance to non-
common law concepts than to the fundamentals of the common law
of contract. In that sense, they have a foreign flavor which may be
distasteful to some. The common law, like the countries in which it
has flourished, has always benefited by taking in foreign ideas, and
making them into its own, but giving them a distinctive and much more
local character. Why not in this instance too?
Indeed, I would use in support arguments raised many years ago in
the United States seeking to establish that whether or not an obligation
were truly contractual, the basis of the recovery of damages was what
was termed the "reliance interest '90 of the plaintiff. The language em-
ployed in that discussion reveals that what is involved is giving the
plaintiff what he has lost through reliance upon the promise made by
the defendant. "Our object is to put him in as good a position as he
was in before the promise was made."'" The whole tenor of the argu-
ment, I would suggest, is that a more subjective approach to the issue
of damages should be made. Cases determined by the use of section
90 of the Restatement seem to support this, at least to the extent of put-
ting the measure of damages in such cases upon the footing of replac-
ing the promisee in his pre-promise situation.9 2 To put it another way,
only those damages should be awarded in such an action as are neces-
sary to prevent injustice.93 The reliance interest of the plaintiff, not
89. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
90. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest In Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Fuller & Perdue].
91. Id. at 54.
92. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.
2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
93. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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what has been termed his expectation interest (i.e., putting him in as
good a position as he would have been had the promise been per-
formed) is the basis of damages in such a case.94 That this is settled
law in the United States has been queried.95 It may be that much de-
pends, as one comment has put it, upon whether this provision of the
Restatement is "read in a flexible spirit."'96 The formula employed is
elastic enough to permit a court to vary the quantum of recovery with
the facts of the individual case. This suggests, to me at any rate, that
if this approach is correct and is widely accepted by courts in the United
States, then in such instances, while the question of liability may be
based upon objective considerations, the extent of any such liability,
i.e., the measure of damages, will be more subjective. With this I
would not disagree. Indeed, as already indicated, I would go further
and make the entire issue turn upon subjective criteria. I do not con-
sider that the present American trend goes far enough toward replacing
the classical law of consideration by more modem and acceptable
theories of liability.
The view put forward in this essay, which, to quote from another
context, should be "read not as law but as an excursus into legal phil-
osophy,"' 7 is that obligations of a contractual nature (if it still be cor-
rect to use that adjective in the future) should be founded not upon
any doctrine of consideration, even augmented or ameliorated by some
notion of promissory estoppel (of the English or the American variety)
but upon the idea that "serious" promises merit enforcement in some
way or another. The exact remedy, and its scope, i.e., specific per-
formance, injunction, damages, and their calculation, may depend upon
the kind of obligation involved and other relevant circumstances, but
the existence of an obligation should be determined in accordance with
the clear wishes of the individuals concerned.98 Of course, this raises
the problem of how one is to decide whether a promise is "serious"
enough to deserve recognition and enforcement by the law. This may
require an investigation of the facts of each individual case (though in
the course of time certain principles may well develop). This is pre-
94. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 90, at 54.
95. See Henderson, supra note 64, at 378.
96. Kessler & Fine, supra note 74, at 424.
97. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 90, at 57.
98. If one party were serious and the other not, or if one were mistaken, how would
a decision be reached? It seems to me that even a unilateral reliance could be en-
forced as long as the relying party acted in good faith. I do not consider this to
be an insoluble problem. After all, even with objective tests and consideration, the law
of mistake and misrepresentation has not been entirely satisfactory.
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cisely what the courts appear to have been doing with respect to liabil-
ity for negligent misrepresentation, an area which is still in the process
of being worked out in detail. This approach could also be taken in
the context of "contract." If the bogeyman of uncertainty is raised
in this regard, I would counter by the language of Fuller and Perdue
written years ago:
The assumption is very commonly made that legal certainty is neces-
sarily promoted by limiting the alternative courses of action open to
judges. Though the all-or-nothing-approach may be harsh, it at least
allows a man to know where he stands. This comforting supposition
can be preserved only so long as one ignores the psychological realities
of the judicial process. 99
Though this was written about the calculation of damages in con-
tract cases, I would suggest that it could be applied to the more basic
problem of creation of a contractual obligation. In less sophisticated
times, possibly, it was necessary to eschew the dangers of excessive
creation of settled principles which could be used as the basis for easy,
certain, and uniform decisions. We have surely gone beyond such a
primitive stage and can safely undertake the problems and hardships
of more variable decisions. It is time for the law of contract to re-
nounce the strictures of the medieval and post-medieval period and
recognize the need for a more liberal, and sympathetic approach to ob-
ligations of this kind.
The law of obligations in general is in a state of flux. Contract, tort,
and quasi-contract (or unjust enrichment or restitution, whichever term
be preferred) have reached a juncture at which they are being sub-
jected to subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, change. Centuries of de-
velopment produced distinctive concepts designed to cope with situa-
tions which were conceived of as being fundamentally different, there-
fore requiring distinctive treatment by the law, theoretically and from
the point of view of remedies. These apparently clear-cut differentia-
tions are now being recognized as sufficiently blurred and unclear to
merit some revision of the attitudes to be adopted. In this essay,
I have been concerned with the law of contract and with the nature of
contractual obligation. My aim has been to argue that the notion of
promise with its concomitant legal consequences and effects should be
regarded differently from the way it is now viewed. Promise, or un-
dertaking, is fundamental to contract. What is to be accepted as a
legally binding promise or undertaking is obviously central to the whole
99. Fuller & Perdue, upra note 90, at 419.
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conception of a contractual obligation. Quintessentially my point is
that, current trends and tendencies being what they are, there is scope
for, and impetus towards, a newer outlook upon the nature and crea-
tion of binding contractual obligations. 100  Indeed, one might go fur-
ther and suggest that, while for analytical purposes some classification
may be sensible and helpful, realistically speaking the tripartite divi-
sion of obligations into contractual, tortious, and quasi-contractual is
no longer as valid or justified as once it may have been. 10 We should
be searching for a more comprehensive definition of obligation in the
law. In place of our somewhat piecemeal exposition of the law (even
the law of contract), can we not now find something more satisfying?
A start could be made by finding a happier, more suitable, explanation
for contractual obligation, from which, possibly, a bridge could be built
towards a more generalized definition of legal obligations of all sorts.
100. Cf. Lewis, Obligation and the Law, 5 OTTAwA L. Rnv. 84, 100-03 (1971).
101. Cf. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 90, at 419, "[The breaking down of these
departmental barriers would represent a distinct service to legal thinking."
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